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TACKLING PASPA: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF SPORTS GAMBLING IN AMERICA
Justin Fielkow, Daniel Werly & Andrew Sensi*
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, between $148–$500 billion worth of illegal wagers were
placed on sporting events in the United States.1  Meanwhile only $4.2
billion was bet legally at Nevada sportsbooks.2  The reason over 97%
of the sports betting market is illegal: the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA).3
Enacted October 28, 1992, PASPA is a federal statute which prohib-
its states from sanctioning or sponsoring sports gambling, except in
states where it had previously been allowed:4 Delaware, Montana, Ne-
vada, and Oregon.5  At the time of PASPA’s passage, the public’s con-
fidence in the purity of sporting events had dwindled following a wave
of match-fixing scandals.6  With as many as thirteen states considering
* Justin Fielkow, JD, Tulane University Law School, Sports Law Certificate.  Mr. Fielkow is
an attorney at the Franklin Law Group in Chicago, Illinois where he represents businesses in the
sports and entertainment fields.
Daniel Werly, JD, Georgetown University Law Center.  Mr. Werly is an experienced sports
lawyer and Editor-in-Chief of the sports law website TheWhiteBronco.com.
Andrew Sensi, JD, Certificate in Sports Law, Tulane University School of Law.  Mr. Sensi is
the Program Manager for the Tulane Center for Sport and Editor-in-Chief of the sports law
website TheSportsEsquires.com.
1. The American Gaming Association conservatively estimated that Americans wagered
$148.8 billion illegally in 2015.  Chris Moyer, March Madness Betting to Total $9.2 Billion this
Year, AM. GAMING ASS’N. (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.americangaming.org/newsroom/press-
releasess/march-madness-betting-total-92-billion-year.  On the high side, Princeton University
economics professor Robert Willig estimates that as much as $500 billion is wagered annually on
sports in the U.S.  See Alexandra Berzon, Betting Against a Gambling Ban, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
17, 2012, 10:05 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873246772045781857340038797
40.
2. See Dustin Gouker, Nevada Sportsbooks Took Record $4.2 Billion in Wagers in 2015, LE-
GAL SPORTS REP. (Feb. 4, 2016, 11:14 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/7902/nevada-re-
cord-sports-betting-2015/ (citing data from the Nevada Gaming Control Board’s monthly report
from December 2015).
3. Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4227 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (2012)).
4. Id.
5. Ryan M. Rodenberg, U.S. Sport’s Opposition to Betting: Potential for Change, WORLD
SPORTS L. REP., Jan. 2012, at 12.
6. See, e.g., Jerome Holtzman, Giamatti Bans Rose for Life, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 25, 1989), http://
articles.chicagotribune.com/1989-08-25/sports/8901070792_1_stain-or-disgrace-mr-rose-bartlett-
giamatti (reporting on Major League Baseball Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti’s decision to
23
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initiatives to allow sports betting within their borders, Congress acted
swiftly to limit the spread of sports gambling, to protect America’s
youth and preserve both the character and integrity of sports.7
In the past decade PASPA has come under attack.  With tax reve-
nue coffers dwindling, several states have turned to sports gambling as
a way to overcome their budget deficits.  In 2008, Montana began of-
fering Montana Sports Action, a lottery game that lets participants
create fantasy football teams.8  In 2009, Delaware revived its Sports
Lottery program,9 and, in both 2012 and 2014, New Jersey passed laws
that sought to permit sports gambling at casinos and racetracks within
the state.10  Yet, New Jersey’s recent attempts to legalize sports wager-
ing have failed to come to fruition as the major professional and ama-
teur sports organizations in the United States—the National Football
League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the Na-
tional Hockey League (NHL), Major League Baseball (MLB), and
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) (collectively,
the Leagues)—have successfully sued to enforce PASPA and preempt
New Jersey’s sports gambling initiative.11
Despite recent setbacks in court, this Article contends the legaliza-
tion of sports gambling remains inevitable.  New Jersey and other
give superstar Pete Rose a lifetime suspension from professional baseball for betting on games);
Frances Frank Marcus, 8 Indicted in Tulane Scandal; School to Give up Basketball, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 5, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/05/sports/8-indicted-in-tulane-scandal-school-to-
give-up-basketball.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the indictment of three Tulane University
basketball players for points-shaving in 1985); John Underwood, The Biggest Game in Town,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 10, 1986), http://www.si.com/vault/1986/03/10/638301/the-biggest-
game-in-town (discussing a scheme to shave points by Boston College basketball players during
the 1978–79 season).
7. Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act—Policy Concerns Behind
Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 8 (1992) (citing Increasing Number of States Are
Considering Initiatives, USA TODAY, June 25, 1991, at 8C).
8. See Montana Sports Action, MONT. LOTTERY, http://montanalottery.com/msa (last visited
Aug. 8, 2016); see also Nando Difino, State of Montana to Institute Fantasy-Football Lottery
Game, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2008, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1219357652405617
11.
9. See OFC Comm Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009); Delaware Sports Lottery,
DEL. LOTTERY GAMES, http://www.delottery.com/games/sports/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2016).
10. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A (West 2012), preempted by PASPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704
(2012).
11. See NCAA v. Governor of N.J. (Christie I), 730 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming the
district court’s finding that PASPA was constitutional and enjoining New Jersey’s 2012 Sports
Wagering Law from going into effect), aff’g No. 12-4947 (MAS) (LHG), 2012 WL 6698684
(D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014); see also NCAA v. Governor of N.J.
(Christie II), 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (affirming the district court’s holding that New Jersey’s
2014 partial repeal of its state prohibitions on sports gambling violated PASPA), aff’g 61 F. Supp.
3d 488 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed,
No. 16-476 (Oct. 7, 2016).
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states interested in authorizing and regulating sports betting still have
a number of options, as regulatory technology continues to evolve and
public opinion is overwhelmingly trending towards acceptance.
Part I provides a robust explanation of the history of sports gambling
and PASPA.12  Part II discusses New Jersey’s Sports Waging Law and
the resulting Christie I case.13  Part III examines the New Jersey Sen-
ate Bill 2460 and the Christie II case stemming from the bill’s enact-
ment.14  Part IV argues that the legalization of sports gambling is
inevitable and discusses the potential routes for legalization.15  Part V
concludes.
I. THE PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS PROTECTION ACT
This Part provides a full understanding of the United States’ history
of sports gambling, the Congressional motives for passing PASPA, and
the early challenges to the statue.
A. History of Sports Gambling in the United States
To comprehend the current climate surrounding sports gambling
and New Jersey’s recent legal challenges to PASPA, it is necessary to
understand the history of sports gambling in America and the mindset
of those who pushed the legislation through Congress.
The United States has had a complicated on-again, off-again rela-
tionship with gambling throughout its history.  In the early eighteenth
century, money from gambling operations was an effective govern-
ment fundraising method in colonial settlements.16  By the nineteenth
century, the country was replete with organized gambling houses,17
and America’s obsession with the so-called “Sport of Kings”—horse
12. See infra notes 16–52 and accompanying text. R
13. See infra notes 53–117 and accompanying text. R
14. See infra notes 118–62 and accompanying text. R
15. See infra notes 163–97 and accompanying text. R
16. See Chil Woo, Note, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 571 (2013) (“All thirteen colonies
used funds from lotteries to help fund substantial public works like the creation of universities
(e.g., Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Dartmouth, Princeton, and William and Mary), churches and
libraries.”); see also ROGER DUNSTAN, CAL. RES. BUREAU, CRB-97-003, GAMBLING IN CALI-
FORNIA (1997), http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/97003a.pdf.  Revenue generated from col-
ony-sanctioned lotteries was even used to help finance the Revolutionary War. See Ronald J.
Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of State Sponsored
Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 12 (1992).
17. See COMM’N ON THE REV. OF THE NAT’L POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN
AMERICA 169 (1976) [hereinafter COMM’N REPORT], https://ia802205.us.archive.org/4/items/
gamblinginameric00unit/gamblinginameric00unit.pdf.  In 1850, New York City was home to six-
thousand gambling houses (one for every eighty-five residents). Id.
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racing—was in full force, with fans permitted to legally wager at race-
tracks across the country.18  Yet, after over a century of being an ac-
cepted practice, gambling reform efforts were underway.19  By the
early twentieth century, members of the Progressive Movement, who
concluded that gambling was among the many social ills in need of
reform, succeeded in their campaign to close down racetracks and out-
law nearly all forms of gambling across the United States.20
America’s attitude toward, and acceptance of, sports gambling soon
reached its low point.  Coinciding with the decline in legal gambling
activities was the rise in popularity of professional baseball.21  As
baseball captured the nation’s attention, it was no coincidence that
there was a corresponding increase in illegal gambling activities—pri-
marily betting on baseball games—largely accomplished through or-
ganized crime syndicates.22  The nation’s consciousness was soon
shocked when it was determined that notorious gangster Arnold
Rothstein had bribed members of the Chicago White Sox to lose the
1919 World Series.23  As a result of the infamous “Black Sox” scandal,
baseball owners appointed Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis as the
first Commissioner in all of professional sports.24  Among Landis’ first
acts was to ban all eight players believed to be part of the conspir-
acy.25  Following the MLB’s lead, every major professional sports
league in the United States now has Commissioners charged with,
among other responsibilities, maintaining the “integrity of the game”
in their respective sports.26
Gradually the negative stigma attached to gambling waned and the
need for revenue rose following the Great Depression.27  States once
again began authorizing certain forms of gambling.28  Gambling on
18. Timeline: Horseracing in the U.S., PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/fea-
tures/timeline/seabiscuit/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2016).  The first Belmont Stakes, Preakness Stakes,
and Kentucky Derby were run in 1867, 1873, and 1875, respectively, and in 1900, horse racing
fans could bet at over three hundred racetracks nationwide. Id.
19. Woo, supra note 16, at 572 (discussing how “[m]any lotteries ended in scandal, with opera- R
tors absconding with or misappropriating proceeds,” which prompted reform).
20. See 2 JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE AMERICAN PAST: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 563
(9th ed. 2010); Woo, supra note 16, at 572. R
21. Woo, supra note 16, at 572. R
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League Commissioner Disciplinary Power:
Bounty and Beyond, 3 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 93, 96 (2014).
25. Id. at 96.
26. See id. at 96–97 (discussing the broad powers of commissioners of the major professional
sports leagues).
27. Woo, supra note 16, at 572. R
28. Id.
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sports contests, however, remained illegal throughout the nation until
1949, when Nevada became the first state to legalize sports wagering
within its borders.29  Although the effects were not immediate, Ne-
vada sportsbooks prospered after Congress lowered the wagering ex-
cise tax in an effort to enable legal bookmakers to be more
competitive with their illegal counterparts.30
Despite the growth of Nevada’s legal sports gambling operations,
especially those in Las Vegas, organized crime remained a problem.
Sophisticated criminal organizations openly defied authorities and
quickly “became the primary operators of [illegal] sports gambling
schemes throughout the United States.”31  As a result, in the early
1960s there was a palpable fear that organized crime would once again
attempt to corrupt professional sports.32  Capitalizing on this fear,
Congress enacted a plethora of laws designed to thwart organized
crime’s grip on the illegal sports gambling marketplace.33  In 1961,
Congress passed the Wire Act,34 the Travel Act,35 and the Interstate
Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act;36 followed by the 1964
Sports Bribery Act,37 and finally, the 1970 Illegal Gambling and Busi-
ness Act.38  Each of these laws aimed at cracking down on organized
crime and illegal gambling rings.
29. See NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (D. Del. 1977) (examining the
history of legal sports betting in the United States).
30. Id. at 1379.  In December 1974, Congress lowered the wagering excise tax from 10% to
2%, and since then, casinos saw a significant increase in their sportsbook revenue. COMM’N
REPORT, supra note 17, at 17 (discussing the reasons behind lowering the tax).  Sports wagering R
in Nevada in the fourth quarter of 1973 was $826,767, but following the lowering of the excise tax
in 1974, wagers rose to $3,873,217 and exploded to $26,170,328 in 1975. NFL, 435 F. Supp. at
1379.  The wagering excise tax was lowered again in 1982 to the current rate of 0.25%.  26 U.S.C.
§ 4401 (2012).
31. Eric Meer, Note, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA): A Bad
Bet for the States, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 281, 284 (2011).
32. See DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMBLING PROHIBITION AND THE IN-
TERNET 93–95 (2005).
33. See id.
34. Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-216, 75 Stat. 491 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1084 (2012)).
35. Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1952 (2012)).
36. Act of Sept. 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-218, 75 Stat. 492 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1953 (2012)).
37. Act of June 6, 1962, Pub. L. No. 88-316, 78 Stat. 293 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 224 (2012)).
38. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 937 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955 (2012)).  The Illegal Gambling Business Act was enacted as part of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18 U.S.C.), which also contains the well-known Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 6 10-APR-17 11:05
28 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:23
Despite the federal government’s best efforts, illegal sports gam-
bling persisted.  According to a 1976 report prepared by the Commis-
sion on the Review of the National Policy Toward Gambling (the
Commission), “effective gambling law enforcement [is] an impossible
task.”39  The Commission found that over two-thirds of the population
indulged in gambling and that approximately 80% of the population
approved of gambling.40  According to the Commission, “Gambling is
inevitable. No matter what is said or done by advocates or opponents
of gambling in all its various forms, it is an activity that is practiced, or
tacitly endorsed, by a substantial majority of Americans.”41
Notwithstanding its conclusions that gambling law enforcement was
“an impossible task,” the Commission opined that current state
prohibitions on sports wagering should remain in place.42  According
to the Commission, it would be unwise for states to engage in legal
sports-betting-activities because a “single-event sports wagering sys-
tem would provide relatively little revenue for the state, and existing
Federal tax policies make effective competition with illegal bookmak-
ers impossible.”43  Thus, sports gambling remained illegal in nearly all
states, with only limited exceptions.44
Perhaps recognizing the impracticality of prohibiting sports betting
outright, the U.S. Department of Justice put “a low priority on en-
forcement of antigambling laws.”45  Fewer individuals were arrested
for engaging in illegal gambling activities every year, and even fewer
received convictions, prison sentences, or substantial fines.46  As a re-
39. COMM’N REPORT, supra note 17, at 35.  The Commission was created by Congress as a R
part of the Organized Crime Control Act, and it conducted forty-three days of hearings and
received testimony from approximately 275 witnesses. Id. at x.
40. Id. at ix.
41. Id. at 1.
42. Id. at 176–78 (recommending that states not legalize sports wagering); see id. at 49–53
(providing recommendations regarding gambling policy and enforcement at the state level).
43. Id. at 4.
44. At the time of the Commission’s report, only Nevada, Montana, and Delaware offered
some form of legal sports betting or lottery. See NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372,
1375, 1379 (D. Del. 1977) (discussing Nevada and Montana’s sports gambling offerings and up-
holding Delaware’s NFL-based lottery game); see also Meer, supra note 31, at 288 (“From 1989 R
until 2007, Oregon operated a sports betting lottery called ‘Sports Action,’ which allowed
Oregonians to make parlay bets on NFL games.  However, on July 1, 2007, the Oregon Legisla-
ture repealed Sports Action in an effort to attract collegiate basketball tournaments to its
state.”).
45. Bart Barnes, Friendly Wagers to Big Bookmaking, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 1982), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/1982/01/18/friendly-wagers-to-big-bookmaking/73abae
5a-3ce8-47f0-9740-b1bb83328ec1.
46. In 1960, almost 123,000 arrests were made for illegal gambling.  Dan McGraw, The Na-
tional Bet, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 7, 1997, at 50.  In 1974, that number dropped by half
to an estimated 61,900 arrests. COMM’N REPORT, supra note 17, at 35–36. R
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 7 10-APR-17 11:05
2016] TACKLING PASPA 29
sult of this lack of enforcement, illegal sports gambling in America
continued to proliferate.  In 1983, approximately $8 billion was wa-
gered illegally on sports in the United States.47  By 1989, the amount
quadrupled to around $50 billion.48
As the amounts wagered on sports increased at an astonishing pace,
so did skepticism that games were being fixed.  In 1980, a scheme to
shave points by Boston College basketball players was revealed when
Henry Hill informed federal prosecutors that he worked with several
players to shave points in nine games during the 1978–79 season.49  A
few years later, in 1985, three Tulane University basketball players
were indicted in a point-shaving case.50  A prominent 1986 Sports Il-
lustrated article exemplified the growing feelings of those who saw
gambling as a plague on sports: “[N]othing has done more to despoil
the games Americans play and watch than widespread gambling on
them.  As fans cheer their bets rather than their favorite teams, dark
clouds of cynicism and suspicion hang over games, and the possibility
of fixes is always in the air.”51 The clamor between the shadowy un-
derworld of sports gambling and its opponents reached its pinnacle in
August 1989, when MLB Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti con-
cluded that Pete Rose “bet on baseball” and the Commissioner an-
nounced that Rose would receive a lifetime banishment.52
B. Congressional Motivations and the Enactment of PASPA
Although most states had already elected to prohibit sports betting
prior to the enactment of PASPA, Congress, for the most part, had
given states the freedom to regulate sports gambling within their bor-
ders.53  That all changed on February 22, 1991.  With the full support
of the professional sports leagues,54 U.S. Senators from the states of
47. McGraw, supra note 46. R
48. Berzon, supra note 1.  Any measure of the illegal sports gambling market is, however, R
inherently imprecise due to the difficultly in gathering accurate figures.  For example, the Organ-
ized Crime and Racketeering Section of the U.S. Department of Justice completed a study in
which it estimated that between $18.5–$25 billion were wagered on sporting events illegally in
1973. COMM’N REPORT, supra note 17, at 132–33.  This is, of course, significantly higher than the R
1983 estimate of $8 billion.  McGraw, supra note 46. R
49. See Underwood, supra note 6.  Yes, the same Henry Hill featured in the 1990 film R
Goodfellas.
50. See Marcus, supra note 6. R
51. Underwood, supra note 6. R
52. Holtzman, supra note 6. R
53. Provided, of course, the state regulations were consistent with the federal government’s
promulgations regarding organized crime and its prohibition on conducting interstate-sports-
gambling schemes. See supra notes 33–38 and accompanying text. R
54. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 14–15 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3564–65,
1991 WL 258663, at *4–5. See Rodenberg, supra note 5, at 12. R
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Utah, Arizona, Pennsylvania, and, ironically, New Jersey introduced
PASPA.55
At the time, the primary arguments in favor of PASPA were (1)
protecting the integrity, and preserving the character, of sports; (2)
shielding America’s impressionable youth from vice; and (3) restrict-
ing any further spreading of state-authorized sports gambling.56
“Integrity” in sports refers to the public’s confidence that games are
free from corruption.  Similarly, the concept of “character” alludes to
the nature of sporting events as wholesome entertainment and compe-
tition.  Ultimately, one of PASPA’s primary goals was to keep sports
“clean.”57  Former NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue, in his Septem-
ber 1991 Congressional testimony, best explained the threat that gam-
bling poses to sports:
First, sports gambling threatens the character of team sports. Our
games embody our very finest traditions and values. . . .  With legal-
ized sports gambling, our games instead will come to represent the
fast buck, the quick fix, the desire to get something for nothing. . . .
Second, sports gambling threatens the integrity of, and public
confidence in, team sports. Sports lotteries inevitably foster a cli-
mate of suspicion about controversial plays and intensify cynicism
with respect to player performances, coaching decisions, officiating
calls and game results.58
55. See Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing on S. 473 and S. 474 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1992) [hereinafter S. 473 and S. 474 Hearing] (S. 473 and S. 474 were cosponsored by
Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Dennis DeConcini (D-AZ), Arlen Specter (R-PA), and Bill
Bradley (D-NJ)).  Senator Bradley was also a former basketball star for the Princeton University
Tigers and the New York Knicks.  It is possible that Senator Bradley had a particularly negative
experience with point shaving during his professional career.  At the end of a Knicks game at
Madison Square Garden, Knicks fans cheered as the opponent cut the lead to three points and
covered the point spread.  John Brennan, Man Behind Sports Betting Ban Stands His Ground,
NORTHJERSEY.COM (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.northjersey.com/news/man-behind-sports-bet-
ting-ban-stands-his-ground-1.268432.  The FBI would later investigate members of the Knicks in
the early 1980s for point-shaving and game-fixing.  Ben Golliver, Reports: FBI Investigated 1980s
Knicks Players for Alleged Game-Fixing, Drug Scandal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 15, 2013),
http://www.si.com/nba/point-forward/2013/09/15/new-york-knicks-gambling-scandal-drugs-co
caine-1980s.  Perhaps motivated by this incident, Bradley was arguably the most important polit-
ical force driving the enactment of PASPA.
56. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5; see also S. 473 and S. 474 Hearing, supra note 55, at 1–2 R
(statement of Dennis DeConcini, Chairman, Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks).
57. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 6.
58. S. 473 and S. 474 Hearing, supra note 55, at 25; see also S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3556. R
Senator Bradley expressed similar sentiments during a 1992 Senate debate. 138 CONG. REC.
33823 (1992) (statement of Sen. Bradley) (“Sports betting threatens the integrity of and public
confidence in professional and amateur team sports, converting sports from wholesome athletic
entertainment into a vehicle for gambling. Sports gambling raises people’s suspicions about
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By restricting the expansion of sports betting, Congress and the
Leagues hoped to re-instill in the public a sense of confidence in the
genuineness of the outcome of games, as well as assuage concerns that
sports were simply becoming a vehicle for gambling, rather than a
form of healthy entertainment.59
With as many as thirteen states considering offering legal sports bet-
ting, proponents of PASPA proclaimed that the statute was needed to
protect minors.60  According to some members of Congress, and
seconded by the Leagues, legalizing sports gambling would not only
send the wrong message to young people, but it would also encourage
their participation in gambling activities.61  In a similar vein, some ar-
gued that legalizing sports betting would give the activity the “impri-
matur of the state”—an appearance of governmental approval—and
thereby increase the number of gamblers who would not have other-
wise engaged in sports betting absent the apparent state sanctions of
such activities.62
Once again, Tagliabue best sums up the arguments of those who
advocated for the passage of PASPA.  When asked how the expansion
of sports lotteries would change anything given the vast sums already
being wagered illegally on sports, Tagliabue responded, “There will be
millions of additional Americans induced and seduced into gambling
if this growth industry is permitted to take the imprimatur of the State
and support State-sanctioned point-spread betting.”63  On October 28,
point-shaving and game-fixing. . . .  If sports betting spreads, more and more fans will question
every coaching decision and official’s call.”).
59. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. R
60. Bradley, supra note 7, at 6–8. R
61. See S. 473 and S. 474 Hearing, supra note 55, at 26 (statement of Paul Tagliabue, Comm’r, R
NFL) (“[L]egalized sports gambling sends a terrible message to youth.  Sports are very impor-
tant to millions of our young people.  Youth look up to athletes.  Our players cannot be expected
to serve as healthy role models for youth if they are made to function as participants in gambling
enterprises.”); see also S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (referring to the proliferation of video games
and video gambling, the Senate Judiciary Committee believed, “Youngsters inevitably would
find sports gambling schemes that utilize these new technologies to be highly seductive”).
62. See 138 CONG. REC. 32,439 (1992) (statement of Rep. Hamilton Fish, Jr., Member, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary) (“If a large number of States and localities make betting on sports a
public institution, they are really incorporating it into the fabric of public policy and implicitly
giving it the stamp of an official sanction.”).
63. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the Subcomm.
on Economics and Commercial Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 26,
52 (1991) (statement of Paul Tagliabue). Francis T. Vincent, Jr., the MLB Commissioner at the
time, expressed a similar sentiment. S. 473 and S. 474 Hearing, supra note 55, at 40.  “Once the R
moral status of sports betting has been redefined by legalization, however, many new gamblers
will be created, some of whom inevitably will seek to move beyond lotteries to wagers with
higher stakes and more serious consequences.” Id.
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1992, less than two years after its introduction, President George H.
W. Bush signed PASPA into law.64
C. PASPA and Pre-Christie Challenges
PASPA is a relatively simple statute.  It prohibits any governmental
entity from sponsoring, operating, advertising, promoting, licensing,
or authorizing by law any “lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting
scheme based . . . on one or more competitive games in which amateur
or professional athletes participate.”65  The Act also provides that a
civil action may be brought in federal court by either the U.S. Attor-
ney General or a professional or amateur sports organization to en-
join any violations of the law.66
The law further contains two limited exemptions—one for states in
which sports wagering had previously existed and the other for
Atlantic City.67  A state is exempt from PASPA’s prohibitions if it
conducted sports betting at any time between 1976 and 1990.68  Addi-
tionally, if a state had a statute permitting sports gambling or lottery
in effect on October 2, 1991, and if betting or lottery had actually oc-
curred between 1989 and 1991, the conduct was exempt.69  Nevada,
Delaware, Montana, and Oregon were the only four states that fit
under these exemptions.70  Under the second exemption, if casino
gambling continuously occurred in a municipality for at least the ten
years prior to PASPA’s effective date, and legislation had been
adopted permitting the conduct within one year of the effective date,
it would be exempt.71  Atlantic City was the only place in the United
States that could meet this exception.72  New Jersey, however, failed
to enact such permissible legislation within the required timeframe.73
At the time of PASPA’s enactment, the primary rationales in sup-
port of the statute were persuasive, and Congress’ effort to stop the
64. PASPA, Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106 Stat. 4227 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 3701–3704 (2012)).
65. Id. § 3702.
66. Id. § 3703.  The law provides, however, that a professional or amateur sports organization
may only bring an action if that organization’s contest is alleged to be the basis of the violation.
Id.
67. See Christopher L. Soriano, The Efforts to Legalize Sports Betting in New Jersey—A His-
tory, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2013, at 22, http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/soriano_njlawyer_
0413.pdf (discussing PASPA’s “grandfather” clauses).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Soriano, supra note 67, at 23. R
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spread of illegal gambling and maintain the integrity of our national
pastimes was, and continues to be, commendable.  Nonetheless, the
period between 1992 and 2016 has demonstrated that, despite the fed-
eral government’s intentions, PASPA has failed to achieve its desired
result.  Recognizing the reality of PASPA’s failure and perhaps sens-
ing an opportunity to generate revenue for ever dwindling state trea-
suries, the 1992 law has come under attack by a number of state and
private actors.
The first assailment of the controversial federal law came in 2009,
when Delaware Governor Jack Markell signed a bill that would grant
racetrack casinos in Delaware the ability to accept bets on any profes-
sional and amateur American sporting event.74  Prior to PASPA, Del-
aware had offered a weekly lottery game, called “Scoreboard,” based
on regularly scheduled NFL games.75  The 2009 law, however, sought
to expand the scope of Delaware’s permissible sports wagering to al-
low single-game bets.76  The law was intended to help close the pro-
jected $700 million deficit for the state’s 2010 budget.77
Before Delaware could accept a single bet, however, the Leagues
filed a complaint—and soon thereafter, a motion for preliminary in-
junction—against Governor Markell and Wayne Lemons, the Direc-
tor of the Delaware State Lottery Office, claiming that elements of
Delaware’s proposed sports betting scheme violated PASPA.  The
United States District Court for the District of Delaware refused to
grant the Leagues’ request for injunction, and on appeal the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that PASPA barred
Delaware from implementing its plan.78  According to the Third Cir-
cuit, Delaware’s proposed law violated PASPA79 because under the
exemption to PASPA the state was constrained to the same scheme
that it had previously conducted through its 1976 Scoreboard games—
multi-bet “parlay” wagers on NFL games.80  While the court con-
cluded that the state was permitted to offer parlay betting on at least
74. Meer, supra note 31, at 281–82. R
75. See NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1376 (D. Del. 1977) (discussing
“Scoreboard”).
76. OFC Comm Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 304 (3d Cir. 2009) (discussing how the 2009
law expanded sports betting beyond what was conducted by Delaware prior to PASPA).
77. Meer, supra note 31, at 281–82 (citing Chad Millman, Delaware Governor Jack Markell Is R
Ready to Legalize Sports Betting in His State, ESPN (Mar. 19, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/
espnmag/story?id=3698082.
78. Markell, 579 F.3d at 304.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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three NFL teams, Delaware was prohibited from allowing single-game
bets or wagers on athletic contests in leagues other than the NFL.81
Another challenge to PASPA also came in 2009.82  “Throughout the
1990s and early 2000s, Atlantic City’s casinos experienced a period of
substantial business success.”83  But gaming revenue in New Jersey be-
gan to decline as a result of the recession that began in 2008.84  “Some
viewed sports betting as a way to enhance Atlantic City as a [tourist]
destination” and increase “both gaming and non-gaming revenues.”85
New Jersey, however, had missed its opportunity to take advantage
of PASPA’s grandfather clause when the state failed to implement leg-
islation that would have legalized sports betting in Atlantic City casi-
nos.86  Nonetheless, in 2009, the Interactive Media & Entertainment
Gaming Association (iMEGA), several horsemen’s groups, and New
Jersey State Senator Raymond Lesniak filed an action against the U.S.
Attorney General, seeking a declaratory ruling that PASPA was un-
constitutional.87  The federal district court quickly concluded that the
plaintiffs did not have standing because neither New Jersey, nor any
of the plaintiff organizations, permitted, offered, or otherwise author-
ized any sort of sports betting scheme at the time of the suit.88  Ac-
cording to the court, the mere threat of federal preemption did not
grant the plaintiffs the right to challenge the constitutionality of a fed-
eral law.89  Thus, the case was dismissed without the U.S. Department
of Justice ever taking a position on the constitutionality of PASPA.90
81. Id.  Despite the limitations placed on the scope of its permissible sports betting operations,
Delaware’s “Sports Lottery” program still sold $37.9 million worth of parlay cards in 2015, rais-
ing $7 million in taxes as a result.  Jonathan Starkey, Sports Betting Lucrative for Delaware,
DELAWAREONLINE (Dec. 4, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/politics/
2015/12/04/sports-gambling/76628358/. This represents a steady increase in sales and revenue
since it began offering the sports lottery in 2010, when it sold $10.8 million in parlay cards and
raised $1.6 million in taxes. Id.
82. See Complaint & Demand for Declaratory Relief, Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming
Ass’n v. Holder, No. 09-CV-01301, 2011 WL 802106 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2009), 2009 WL 4890878.
83. See Soriano, supra note 67, at 23. R
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also State of the States: The AGA Survey of Casino Entertainment, AM. GAMING
ASS’N 2 (2013), https://www.americangaming.org/industry/factsheets/issues_detail.cfv?Id=16 (last
visited Aug. 4, 2016).  In 2012, casino visitors in Nevada legally wagered more than $3.4 billion
on sporting events, and those sportsbooks, which are heavily taxed, generated gross gaming rev-
enues in excess of $170 million. Id. at 39.
86. Soriano, supra note 67, at 23. R
87. See Interactive Media, 2011 WL 802106, at *1–2.
88. Id. at *10.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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II. THE SPORTS WAGERING LAW AND CHRISTIE I
This Part first discusses New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law. This
Part then turns to the resulting Christie I challenge and provides a full
explanation of the Constitutional issues raised in the case.
A. The 2012 Sports Wagering Law
Seeking to boost its struggling economy and “to stanch the sports-
wagering black market flourishing within [New Jersey’s] borders,”91
the New Jersey voters passed a referendum that amended the state’s
Constitution to permit the legislature to “authorize by law wagering
. . . on the results of professional, college, or amateur sport or athletic
event[s].”92  Thereafter, on January 17, 2012, the legislature enacted
the Sports Wagering Law,93 which permitted New Jersey authorities to
license sports gambling in casinos and racetracks, and casinos to oper-
ate “sports pools.”94
B. Christie I
After the Sports Wagering Law was passed, the Leagues sued New
Jersey Governor Chris Christie, New Jersey’s Racing Commissioner,
and New Jersey’s Director of Gaming Enforcement (collectively, New
Jersey) in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey.  The
Leagues alleged that the law violated PASPA (Christie I).95  In re-
sponse, New Jersey contended that PASPA was unconstitutional, in
violation of the Commerce Clause and the U.S. Constitution’s anti-
commandeering and equal sovereignty principles.96  The District
Court found PASPA to be constitutional, granted summary judgment
in favor of the Leagues, and enjoined the Sports Wagering Law from
91. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 217 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brief for Appellants Christopher J.
Christie, David L. Rebuck & Frank Zanzuccki at 13, Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (No. 13-1715), 2013
WL 1873966, at *13).
92. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶¶ 2(D), (F).
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-1 to -6 (West 2012 & Supp. 2014) (repealed 2014).
94. Id. § 5:12A-2; see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:69N-1 (West 2016) (regulations implement-
ing the law).
95. The New Jersey Senate Majority Leader Stephen Sweeney, New Jersey House Speaker
Sheila Oliver, and New Jersey Thoroughbred Horesemen’s Association (the owner of the Mon-
mouth Park Racetrack intervened as defendants).  Christie I, No. 12-4947 (MAS) (LHG), 2012
WL 6698684, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2012) (holding that Plaintiffs had standing to challenge New
Jersey Sports Wagering Law), aff’d, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866
(2014); see also Christie I, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (D.N.J. 2013) (holding that New Jersey’s
Sports Wagering Law was preempted by PASPA), aff’d, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), cert denied,
134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
96. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 224–40 (3d Cir. 2013).
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going into effect.97  The state appealed the District Court’s opinion to
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.98  After granting an expedited ap-
peal and hearing oral argument, in a 2–1 decision, the Third Circuit
affirmed the District Court.99
1. Standing
Before reaching the merits, the Third Circuit reviewed whether the
Leagues had standing to sue New Jersey.  Unlike in the iMEGA case,
in which the district court determined that the New Jersey plaintiffs
lacked standing because they were unaffected parties and the suit was
premature in the absence of passed legislation,100 the court in Christie
I concluded that the Leagues had standing because the Sports Wager-
ing Law was “as much directed at the Leagues’ events as it [was]
aimed at the casinos,”101 thus, the Leagues’ games were the object of
state-licensed gambling.102   Moreover, the Third Circuit found that
the Sports Wagering Law would impact the “integrity” of the Leagues’
games, causing reputational harm to the Leagues.103
2. The Commerce Clause
Turning to New Jersey’s arguments that PASPA was unconstitu-
tional, the Third Circuit first analyzed whether Congress had the au-
thority under the Commerce Clause to regulate activities that PASPA
governs.104  Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the abil-
ity to “regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the sev-
eral States, and with the Indian Tribes.”105  Under this clause,
Congress may regulate an activity that “substantially affects interstate
commerce” if it “arise[s] out of or [is] connected with a commercial
transaction.”106
The court found that the activity PASPA governs, state-licensed wa-
gering on sports, is interstate commerce activity that may be regulated
by Congress under the Commerce Clause because (1) wagering and
the operations of sports leagues are economic activity, (2) sporting
97. Christie I, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 579 (D.N.J. 2013).
98. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
99. See id. at 208–09, 217, 241.
100. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, No. 09-CV-01301, 2011 WL
802106, at *10 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2009).
101. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 219 (3d Cir. 2013).
102. Christie I, 730 F.3d at 219.
103. Id. at 220–23.
104. Id. at 224–26.
105. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
106. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995).
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events hosted all across the country “substantially affect” interstate
commerce, and (3) the $500 billion that Americans gamble on sports
each year also “substantially affects” interstate commerce.107
3. Anti-Commandeering Principle
After determining that Congress had authority to implement
PASPA under the Commerce Clause, the court addressed New
Jersey’s argument that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering prin-
ciple, which prohibits any federal law that “commandeers the legisla-
tive process of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program.”108
In order for Congress to “commandeer” a state legislative process,
Congress must impose a federal scheme on state officials and cannot
merely invalidate contrary state laws.109  For example, in New York v.
United States,110 the Supreme Court found that a law that forced states
to take title to radioactive waste if they did not arrange for the dispo-
sal of the waste by a certain date, commandeered the states because it
forced them to “enact and enforce a federal regulatory program” or
expend resources in taking title to the waste.111  Here, in contrast, the
court found that the anti-commandeering principle was not violated
because PASPA merely invalidates state laws attempting to regulate
sports gambling and “does not require or coerce the states to lift a
finger.”112
4. Equal Sovereignty Principle
Finally, the Third Circuit considered whether PASPA violated “the
equal sovereignty of the states by singling out Nevada for preferential
treatment and allowing only that State to maintain broad state-spon-
sored sports gambling.”113  The court rejected New Jersey’s argument,
holding that while legislation under the Commerce Clause may be
limited by the equal sovereignty principle in certain aspects, Congress
is not prevented from enacted laws that treat states differently.114  In-
deed, the Commerce Clause authority is aimed at matters of national
107. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 224–25 (3d Cir. 2015).
108. Id. at 227 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
(1981), abrogated by Ala. Elk River Dev. Agency v. Rogers, 516 So. 2d 637 (Ala. 1987)).
109. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 230 (3d Cir. 2015).
110. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
111. Id. at 149–54, 161, 175 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
112. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 231 (3d Cir. 2013).
113. Id. at 237–40.  Delaware, Montana, and Oregon also permitted “lotteries tied to the out-
come of sport events.” Id. at 215.
114. Id. at 238.
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concern, and laws enacted under the clause “will necessarily affect
states differently.”115
5. Judge Vanaskie’s Dissent
Although the Third Circuit ruled in favor of the Leagues, it was not
a unanimous decision.  In his dissenting opinion, Judge Thomas
Vanaskie argued that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering princi-
ple by policing the manner in which state governments regulate inter-
state commerce.116  Unlike the majority, Judge Vanaskie found no
difference between “compelling state governments to exercise their
sovereignty to enact or enforce laws on the one hand, and restricting
state governments from exercising their sovereignty to enact or en-
force laws on the other.”117
III. NEW JERSEY SB 2460 AND CHRISTIE II
The Third Circuit ruled against New Jersey in Christie I, but its
opinion may have effectively provided a roadmap for the state to le-
galize sports betting without running afoul of PASPA.  Sensing an op-
portunity based on the language used by the court in its majority
opinion, New Jersey attempted a PASPA end-around by partially re-
pealing its current state law prohibitions against sports gambling.
A. The 2014 Law
Sports gambling had been prohibited in New Jersey for many years
by statute and by the state Constitution.118  As previously discussed,
New Jersey’s initial attempt to legalize sports wagering within its bor-
ders fell flat when a federal district court in Christie I held that PASPA
was constitutional and enjoined the implementation of the 2012 Sports
Wagering Law, which the Third Circuit affirmed.119  The Third Circuit,
however, opined:
115. Id.
116. Id. at 241–45 (Vanaskie, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  Judge Vanaskie agreed
with the majority that the Leagues had standing and that PASPA does not violate the Equal
Sovereignty Principle or the Commerce Clause. Id.
117. Id. at 251.
118. See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:40-1 to -9 (West 2016).  An
amendment to the New Jersey Constitution, which permitted the state legislature to “authorize
by law” sports wagering at casinos at racetracks, was approved at the general election in Novem-
ber 2011.  N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 2 (historical note to 2011 Amendment).
119. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 215 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that while the court was “cognizant
that certain questions related to this case—whether gambling on sporting events is harmful to
the games’ integrity and whether states should be permitted to license and profit from the activ-
ity—engender strong views,” it declined to “judge the wisdom of PASPA or of New Jersey’s law,
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[W]e do not read PASPA to prohibit New Jersey from repealing its
ban on sports wagering. . . .  [U]nder PASPA, on the one hand, a
state may repeal its sports wagering ban, a move that will result in
the expenditure of no resources or effort by any official. On the
other hand, a state may choose to keep a complete ban on sports
gambling, but it is left up to each state to decide how much of a law
enforcement priority it wants to make of sports gambling, or what
the exact contours of the prohibition will be.120
Seizing upon the language in the Third Circuit’s majority opinion,
the New Jersey Legislature enacted Senate Bill 2460 in 2014 (2014
Law).121  The 2014 Law provided that:
[A]ny rules and regulations that may require or authorize any State
agency to license, authorize, permit or otherwise take action to al-
low any person to engage in the placement or acceptance of any
wager on any professional, collegiate, or amateur sport contest or
athletic event, or that prohibit participation in or operation of a
pool that accepts such wagers, are repealed to the extent they apply
or may be construed to apply at a casino or gambling house operat-
ing in this State in Atlantic City or a running or harness horse race-
track in this State, to the placement and acceptance of wagers on
professional, collegiate, or amateur sports contests or athletic events
. . . .122
In essence, rather than approving legislation that would authorize
sports betting, the 2014 Law had the effect of partially repealing its
current state law prohibitions, thereby allowing sports gambling only
in casinos and racetracks that are licensed and regulated by the state
of New Jersey.123
B. Christie II
1. Partial Repeal: Authorization or Deregulation?
In October 2014, the Leagues challenged the 2014 Law, filing a sec-
ond complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against Governor
or of the desirability of the activities they seek to regulate,” and holding that “New Jersey’s
sports wagering law conflicts with PASPA and, under our Constitution, must yield”).
120. Id. at 232–33 (emphasis added); see also id. at 235 (noting that “PASPA gives states the
choice of either implementing a ban on sports gambling or of accepting complete deregulation of
that field as per the federal standard”).
121. S. 2460, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014); see Act of Oct. 17, 2014, 2014 N.J. Laws ch. 62
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-7 to -9 (West 2014), invalidated by Christie II, 832 F.3d
389 (3d Cir. 2016)).
122. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-7.
123. Id.  The 2014 Law also prohibited wagering on New Jersey’s college teams’ competitions
and on any collegiate competition occurring in New Jersey, and it limited sports wagering to
“persons 21 years of age or older” situated at New Jersey racetracks and Atlantic City casinos
and gambling houses. Id.
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Christie (Christie II).124  According to the Leagues, the 2014 Law was
“nothing more than a de facto authorization of sports gambling.”125
While the Leagues complained the legislation repealed “all existing
prohibitions, rules, and regulations that are specific to sports wager-
ing,” it did so “only at Atlantic City casinos and horse racetracks
throughout the state—in other words, only at venues that are already
state-licensed and regulated.”126  As such, the Leagues argued that the
effect of the 2014 Law was to authorize and license sports gambling
and therefore, like its 2012 predecessor, was in violation of PASPA.127
New Jersey claimed that it was “deregulating” and removing the
activity from the state’s control by partially repealing its state laws
restricting sports betting.128  The state believed that its partial repeal
was consistent with the Third Circuit’s majority opinion,129 which held
that “under PASPA . . . a state may repeal its sports wagering ban, a
move that will result in the expenditure of no resources or effort by
any state official.”130  New Jersey believed the 2014 Law would not
run afoul of PASPA’s prohibition against a state government’s ability
to “sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize” a sys-
tem to wager on sporting contests.131
Governor Christie’s efforts were at least temporarily derailed in
November 2014 when the district court held that New Jersey’s law
violated PASPA,132 and again in August 2015, when the Third Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s decision.133  According to the appellate
court, New Jersey could not simply use “clever drafting” to sidestep
PASPA.134  “The word ‘authorize’ means, inter alia ‘[t]o empower; to
give a right or authority to act,’ or ‘[t]o permit a thing to be done in
the future.’”135  The 2014 Law provided specific instructions on who
may legally place a bet and selectively dictated where a bet could be
placed and on what sports, because of which the court concluded that
124. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Christie II, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488
(D.N.J. 2014), 2014 WL 5395199.
125. Id. ¶ 5.
126. Id.
127. Id. ¶ 1.
128. Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 264, 271 (3d Cir. 2015).
129. Id. at 264.
130. Christie I, 730 F.3d 209, 233 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
131. Id. at 232.
132. See Christie II, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 506 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d on reh’g, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir.
2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-476 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2016).
133. Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 268 (3d Cir. 2015).
134. Id. at 267.
135. Id. at 266 (alteration in original) (quoting Authorize, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.
1990)).
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the practical effect of the law was more than a repeal, but rather it
“affirmatively authorized” sports betting such that it constituted an
“authorization” in violation of PASPA.136  According to the Third Cir-
cuit’s majority opinion, “[W]e acknowledge New Jersey’s salutary pur-
pose in attempting to legalize sports gambling to revive its troubled
casino and racetrack industries.”137  “We now turn to the primary
question before us: whether the 2014 law violates PASPA.  We hold
that it does.”138
2. Judge Fuentes’ Dissent
Seemingly left for dead, New Jersey was thrown a lifeline from an
unexpected source: Third Circuit Judge Julio Fuentes.  Judge Fuentes,
who previously had ruled against New Jersey in Christie I, penned a
passionate dissent in Christie II.139  Whereas the majority opinion in
Christie II contended that “the ‘selective’ nature of the 2014 Law”
granted permission “to certain entities to engage in sports gambling,”
Judge Fuentes argued that the 2014 Law contained no explicit grant of
permission for any entity to engage in sports wagering (as required by
PASPA).140  According to Judge Fuentes, the majority’s analysis inap-
propriately equated authorization with repeal.141  “In holding that a
partial repeal of prohibitions is state authorization, the majority must
infer authorization. PASPA, however, contemplates more.”142
Further, Judge Fuentes argued that the logic employed in the ma-
jority opinion left New Jersey with “no choice,” contradicting the
court’s holding in Christie I—also drafted by Judge Fuentes—and po-
136. Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[T]he 2014 Law authorizes sports gambling
by selectively dictating where sports gambling may occur, who may place bets in such gambling,
and which athletic contests are permissible subjects for such gambling.”).
137. Id. at 264.
138. Id. at 265.
139. See id. at 268–72 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 270 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 269 (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (discussing primary issue with majority opinion).
142. Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 269 (3d Cir. 2015) (Fuentes, J., dissenting), aff’d on reh’g, 832
F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-476 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2016).  In
support of its belief that the 2014 Law does not amount to an “authorization” in violation of
PASPA, the dissent also cited the United States’ 2014 brief in opposition to New Jersey’s petition
for certiorari. Id. at 271 (citing Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11, Christie II, Nos.
13–967, 13–979, 13–980 (U.S. May 14, 2014) 2014 WL 1989100).  In its brief, “the United States
went as far as to concede that New Jersey could repeal its prohibitions in whole or in part.” Id.
According to the dissent, because a partial repeal is merely a “self-executing deregulatory mea-
sure that repeals existing prohibitions and regulations for sports wagering and requires the State
to abdicate any control or involvement in sports wagering,” it is not an authorization prohibited
by PASPA. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\66-1\DPL104.txt unknown Seq: 20 10-APR-17 11:05
42 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:23
tentially violated the anti-commandeering principle of the U.S. Con-
stitution.143  The dissent reasoned:
If withdrawing prohibitions on “some” sports wagering is the
equivalent to authorization by law, then withdrawing prohibitions
on all sports wagering must be considered authorization by law.
Under this logic, New Jersey is left with no choice at all—it must
uphold all prohibitions on sports wagering in perpetuity or until
PASPA is no more. This is precisely the opposite of what we held in
Christie I—“[n]othing in these words requires that the states keep
any law in place”—and why we found PASPA did not violate the
anti-commandeering principle.144
3. Rehearing En Banc
Just weeks after the Third Circuit published its opinion, the New
Jersey parties filed a motion for a rehearing of the case en banc.145
Likely as a result of Judge Fuentes’ dissent, the Third Circuit granted
the state’s request for rehearing.146  The rehearing en banc gave the
full court the opportunity to resolve some of the apparent inconsisten-
cies from the results of Christie I and Christie II.147
By a 9–3 margin, the Third Circuit panel again affirmed the district
court’s holding that the 2014 Law violated PASPA.148  According to
the court, the 2014 Law “provides the authorization for [sports bet-
ting] conduct that is otherwise clearly and completely legally prohib-
ited.”149  The court clarified that, even though the 2014 Law contains
the word “repeal,” its actual impact was an “affirmative authoriza-
143. Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 270–71 (3d Cir. 2015).
144. Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
145. See Petition for Rehearing and/or Rehearing En Banc for Appellants Christopher J.
Christie, David L. Rebuck & Frank Zanzuccki at iii, Christie II, 799 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (No.
14–4546), http://thesportsesquires.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/State-Defendants-Petition-
for-Rehearing-by-Third-Circuit-Christie-II.pdf.  An en banc rehearing is a rare review in which
all or most of the sitting judges of the Third Circuit, not just the three judges that heard the
initial case, are provided the opportunity to hear the case. See INTERNAL OPERATING PROCE-
DURES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 9.2 (2015), http://
www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/legacyfiles/2015_IOPs.pdf (providing that en banc hearings are granted
only in “extraordinary” cases where hearing by a full court is of “immediate importance”).
146. See Order Sur Petitions for Rehearing En Banc, Christie II, F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2015) (Nos.
14-4546, 14-4568, 14-4569), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/14454
6po.pdf (granting rehearing en banc of Christie II).
147. See Daniel Wallach, New Jersey Faces Tough Climb in Winning over Judges on Sports
Betting Case, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Feb. 16, 2016, 8:39 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/
8300/new-jersey-sports-betting-rehearing-2/ (analyzing potential arguments on rehearing).
148. See Christie II, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-476
(U.S. Oct. 7, 2016).
149. Id. at 396.
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tion” of sports betting activities in violation of PASPA.150  The Third
Circuit also used the rehearing as an opportunity to backtrack on its
majority opinion in Christie I:
To the extent that in Christie I we took the position that a repeal
cannot constitute an authorization, we now reject that reasoning.
Moreover, we do not adopt the District Court’s view that the op-
tions available to a state are limited to two. Neither of these pro-
positions were necessary to their respective rulings and were, in
essence, dicta.151
Accordingly, the court expressly declined to articulate a line whereby
a partial repeal of a sports wagering ban would not amount to an un-
lawful authorization under PASPA.152  Rather, it merely opined that
“[i]t is sufficient to conclude that the 2014 Law overstepped [that
line].”153
The Third Circuit panel further made clear that it was not per-
suaded by New Jersey’s Tenth Amendment arguments.154  In order for
Congress to “commandeer” a state, it must impose a federal scheme
on state officials and cannot merely invalidate contrary state laws.155
In Christie I, the court found that the anti-commandeering principle
was not violated, because PASPA merely invalidates state laws at-
tempting to regulate sports gambling and “does not require or coerce
the states to lift a finger.”156  On rehearing, the Third Circuit reached
a similar conclusion, finding that “PASPA does not command states to
take affirmative actions, and it does not present a coercive binary
choice.”157
Two dissenting opinions authored by Judge Fuentes and Judge
Vanaskie, respectively, attacked different parts of the majority opin-
ion.158  According to Judge Fuentes, the 2014 Law strictly repealed
New Jersey’s prohibitions against sports betting and was therefore not
“authorizing” any state conduct in violation of PASPA.159  Meanwhile,
Judge Vanaskie (who also dissented in Christie I) disagreed with the
150. Id. at 397 (“The presence of the word ‘repeal’ does not prevent us from examining what
the provision actually does, and the Legislature’s use of the term does not change that the 2014
Law selectively grants permission to certain entities to engage in sports gambling.”).
151. Id. at 396–97.
152. Id. at 402.
153. Id.
154. See Christie II, 832 F.3d 389, 401–02 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, No.
16-476 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2016).
155. See, e.g., Printz v. United States., 521 U.S. 898, 916, 925 (1997); New York. v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
156. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 231 (3d Cir. 2013).
157. Christie II, 832 F.3d 389, 401 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc).
158. Id. at 402 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); id. at 406 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 403–06.
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majority’s holding that PASPA does not commandeer the states.160
Judge Vanaskie contended that there was no difference between com-
pelling state governments to exercise their sovereignty to enact or en-
force laws and restricting them from doing so.161  Inasmuch, Judge
Vanaskie maintained the majority’s distinction was “illusory” and the
opinion did not give the states any option except to “maintain an anti-
sports wagering scheme” directly in violation of the anti-comman-
deering principle.162
IV. THE FUTURE OF PASPA AND SPORTS BETTING
IN THE UNITED STATES
Notwithstanding the unlikely chance that the United States Su-
preme Court elects to hear Christie II on appeal, the Third Circuit’s
ruling once again sets back the timeline for bringing legal sports bet-
ting to the majority of the nation.  Yet, many scholars continue to
posit that legalization remains inevitable, even if the route is still
undetermined.163
A. Route Forward
The most obvious route is the aforementioned Supreme Court ap-
peal.  According to State Senator Raymond Lesniak, who has
spearheaded New Jersey’s sports betting efforts, the state intends to
petition the Supreme Court to hear the case.164  The Third Circuit’s
opinion deals heavily with constitutional issues—something the Su-
preme Court often looks for in determining whether to grant certio-
rari165—as well as multiple dissenting opinions, which may
demonstrate a significant difference in opinion among federal appeals
judges.  However, only about 1% of petitions are accepted by the Su-
preme Court,166 and it has already declined to hear New Jersey’s ap-
160. Id. at 406.
161. Id. at 406–08.
162. Id. at 408, 411.
163. See Bob Cohn, Legalized Sports Gambling Across U.S. Could Soon Become Reality,
TRIBLIVE (June 20, 2015, 9:30 PM), http://triblive.com/sports/nationworldsports/8532839-74/
sports-betting-gambling (quoting attorneys, team owners, and league officials regarding the like-
lihood of legal sports betting); Daniel Wallach, How to Legalize Sports Betting, DEADSPIN (Aug.
31, 2016, 4:30 PM), http://deadspin.com/how-to-legalize-sports-betting-1786002079.
164. David Purdum, Appeals Court Rejects New Jersey’s Bid to Legalize Sports Betting, ESPN
(Aug. 10, 2016, 8:32 AM), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/17253701/appeals-court-rejects-
new-jersey-bid-legalize-sports-betting.
165. See generally Types of Cases the Court Hears, SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://supremecourt
history.org/htcw_casesthecourthears.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2016).
166. The Supreme Court “receives approximately 7,000-8,000 petitions for a writ of certiorari
each term, but grants and hears oral argument in [only] about 80 cases.” Frequently Asked Ques-
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peal following Christie I.167  As such, the odds the Supreme Court
reviews Christie II appear long.
Another possible route to legalization would be the so-called “nu-
clear option.”168  The Third Circuit has concluded that New Jersey’s
partial repeal was tantamount to an authorization of sports gambling
activities in the state, in large part because it had the effect of allowing
sports gambling only in state-licensed and state-regulated casinos and
racetracks.169  While the Third Circuit, on rehearing, declined to cre-
ate a bright-line rule as to when a partial repeal would not amount to
a state “authorizing” sports gambling,170 it is widely accepted that a
full repeal of a state’s current laws against sports gambling would not
violate PASPA.171  Such a repeal would, in effect, create an entirely
unregulated environment for sports betting in which anyone who
wanted could offer wagering legally within a state.  For both political
and logistical reasons,172 it seems unlikely that a state, whether New
Jersey or otherwise, would take such a drastic step.  The “nuclear op-
tion” may, however, be the solution that puts the most pressure on
Congress and the Leagues, faced with the potential of sports betting
existing in a completely unregulated manner, to work quickly towards
a federal solution.
Another option is for additional states to bring challenges.173  While
New Jersey’s efforts have been at the forefront, a number of other
states may be poised to adopt sports betting regulations.  For example,
both Minnesota and Mississippi have previously introduced legislation
tions, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last updated Aug.
13, 2016).
167. Christie I, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
168. Vincent Oliver, The Problems with the New Jersey Sports Betting Decision, and NJ’s Next
Steps, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Aug. 17, 2016, 9:19 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/11060/nj-
sports-betting-case-analysis/ (explaining that the “nuclear option” is Congress fully repealing its
sports betting prohibition).
169. See Christie II, 832 F.3d 389, 396 (3d Cir. 2015) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-
476 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2016).
170. Id. at 397.
171. See Christie I, 730 F.3d 208, 233 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014); see
also Christie II, 799 F.3d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 2015), aff’d on reh’g, 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016) (en
banc), petition for cert. filed, No. 16-476 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2016).
172. “Politicians would have to vote for a bill that would CREATE UNREGULATED GAMBLING.
This is a difficult position to support, no matter what the ends.”  Dustin Gouker, The Path For-
ward for Sports Betting in New Jersey, US Is Daunting After Court Loss, LEGAL SPORTS REP.
(Aug. 11, 2016, 12:02 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/11015/whats-next-for-sports-bet-
ting-in-new-jersey-and-the-us/.  Further, even if Congress was forced to act in regard to PASPA,
the passage of any federal legislation is typically a slow process. Id.  “Meanwhile, New Jersey
would be left with an unregulated gambling environment for an undetermined amount of time.”
Id.
173. See Wallach, How to Legalize, supra note 163. R
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that would permit wagering on the results of athletic events.174  Other
states, such as New York, are reportedly considering adopting laws
that would set themselves up for a PASPA challenge.175  Although
persuasive, the Third Circuit’s holdings in both Christie I and Christie
II are not binding on federal courts in other jurisdictions.  Further-
more, the nuanced arguments set forth by New Jersey led to three
split decisions in the Third Circuit.  It is, therefore, not inconceivable
that another court could reach a different conclusion regarding the
same or similar laws.176
B. A Static Law Operating in a Digital World
A lot has changed in the two decades since PASPA was signed into
law.  In 1989, only 15% of households even owned a computer, let
alone had access to the Internet.177  Now, Americans can wear glasses
that double as a personal computer178 and are sharing the roads with
autonomous, self-operating cars.179  Technology has rapidly evolved,
and it has changed the way in which we consume and interact with
sports.  Yet, in most of the United States, it remains illegal to place a
bet on your favorite sports team.
“In many countries, sports wagering is legal and regulated, with
scandals more readily exposed and violators punished”—in large part
due to enhancements in technology and strong regulations emphasiz-
ing transparency.180  Generally, sports in the United Kingdom and
174. See, e.g., H.F. 765, 2015 Leg., 89th Sess. (Minn. 2015), https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/
text.php?number=HF0765&version=latest&session=89&session_number=0&session_year=2015;
H.B. 806, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015), http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2015/html/
HB/0800-0899/HB0806IN.htm.
175. Sara Friedman, New York Ponders PASPA Challenge, GAMBLINGCOMPLIANCE (Aug. 11,
2016), https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/news_analysis/new-york-ponders-pas
pa-challenge.
176. Additionally, it is one thing for the Leagues to litigate against a single state, as they
successfully did with New Jersey, but it is another thing to have to confront multiple legal chal-
lenges all at one time across various jurisdictions.  If multiple states mount legal challenges, the
additional litigation pressure could be enough to achieve the desire effect, (e.g., the Leagues
urging Congress to act).
177. Home Computers and Internet Use in the United States: August 2000, U.S. CENSUS BU-
REAU (Sept. 2001), https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p23-207.pdf.
178. David Goldman, Google Unveils ‘Project Glass’ Virtual-Reality Glasses, CNN (Apr. 4,
2012, 2:35 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/04/technology/google-project-glass/.
179. John Ramsey, Self-Driving Cars To Be Tested on Virginia Highways, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH (June 1, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.richmond.com/news/article_b1168b67-3b2b-
5274-8914-8a3304f2e417.html.
180. See Stephen F. Ross & Adrian Anderson, Strong Regulation Could Inject Integrity into
Sports Gambling, SPORTS BUS. J. (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/
Issues/2015/02/16/Opinion/Ross-Anderson.aspx.
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Australia are seen as fair and clean.181  Meanwhile, China and India—
the nations with the largest populations of sports consumers—outlaw
sports gambling in all forms.182  In these markets, unregulated gam-
bling has thrived and corruption has flourished.183
In the United States, it is estimated that between $148–$500 billion
worth of wagers were placed on sporting events in 2015—very little of
it legally.184  “It is easier than ever to place a bet . . . illegally on one of
a few hundred offshore websites” with our society’s continually in-
creasing Internet connectivity.185  Despite Congress’ best intentions,
sports betting currently exists in a wholly unregulated environment,
with states powerless to take action.  “Prohibition, we’ve found in this
country, doesn’t work very well,” said Geoff Freeman, President and
CEO of the American Gaming Association.186  “It’s certainly not
working with sports betting.”187
Although no safeguard is foolproof, technology has advanced to the
point where the integrity of America’s pastimes can be best protected
through transparent regulation, rather than prohibition.188  According
to Lee Amaitis, President and CEO of CG Technology, “[t]echnology
helps monitor accountability.”189  For example, current advances in
technology assist regulators in tracking customers’ activity and identi-
fying irregular betting patterns.190
As NBA Commissioner Adam Silver wrote in a November 2014 op-
ed published in the New York Times, “Times have changed since
[PASPA] was enacted. Gambling has increasingly become a popular
and accepted form of entertainment in the United States.”191  Rather
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.  “The Singaporean and Malaysian soccer leagues folded in the 1990s, and the Chinese
football league disbanded after sponsors Pirelli and China Central TV pulled out due to endemic
match-fixing. One of the fastest-growing leagues in world sports, the Indian Premier League in
cricket, has also been rocked by ongoing match-fixing scandals.” Id.
184. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. R
185. Bob Cohn, Technology Driving Sports Gambling Industry, TRIBLIVE (June 27, 2015,
9:30 PM), http://triblive.com/sports/nationworldsports/8532857-74/betting-technology-sports.
186. Mark Gruetze, Expansion of Sports Betting Moves from ‘What If’ to ‘When,’ TRIBLIVE
(Apr. 10, 2016, 9:00 PM), http://triblive.com/aande/gambling/10270770-74/sports-million-betting.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., Kevin F. King, Note, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Curing In-
ternet Gambling’s Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 57–63 (2010) (discussing
the use of geolocation technology to regulate Internet gambling).
189. Cohn, Technology Driving Sports, supra note 185.  CG Technology is “a global technol- R
ogy solutions provider for lottery, gaming, race and sports wagering.” Id.
190. Id.
191. Adam Silver, Opinion, Legalize and Regulate Sports Betting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-legalize-sports-bet
ting.html?smid=tw-share&_r=0.
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than continuing to shun America’s underground sports gambling in-
dustry, Commissioner Silver asserted that the nation’s leaders should
take control of the system by calling for Congress to adopt a federal
framework that allows states to authorize betting on professional
sports, subject to strict regulatory requirements and technological
safeguards.192  According to Commissioner Silver:
These requirements would include: mandatory monitoring and re-
porting of unusual betting-line movements; a licensing protocol to
ensure betting operators are legitimate; minimum-age verification
measures; geo-blocking technology to ensure betting is available
only where it is legal; mechanisms to identify and exclude people
with gambling problems; and education about responsible
gaming.193
In line with Commissioner Silver’s comments, the prevailing senti-
ment in the United States continues to be one of acceptance of legal-
ized sports betting.  Of those who watched Super Bowl 50, 80% want
to see the country’s current sports betting laws change.194  The NHL
recently placed a franchise in Las Vegas,195 and the NFL is reportedly
considering doing the same.196  The explosive growth of daily fantasy
sports has also blurred the line between traditional fantasy sports and
gambling.  Fantasy sports players are predicted to spend up to “$14
billion in entry fees by 2020.”197  As regulatory technology and atti-
tudes regarding sports betting continue to evolve, the most likely path
towards the legalization of sports betting in the United States remains
an amendment to, or the repeal of, PASPA.
V. CONCLUSION
When PASPA was enacted in 1992, its proponents argued that an
outright ban of sports gambling was the most effective way to achieve
PASPA’s laudable goals.  Time has proven, however, that the statute
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. “Some two-thirds, or 66 percent of those questioned, believe individual states should
have the ability to legalize sports betting.”  Howard Stutz, Survey: Americans Want Ability to
Legally Wager in the Super Bowl, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Feb. 3, 2016, 12:51 PM), http://www.re
viewjournal.com/sports/betting/survey-americans-want-ability-legally-wager-the-super-bowl.
195. Dan Rosen, Las Vegas Awarded NHL Franchise, NHL (June 22, 2016), https://www.nhl
.com/news/nhl-expands-to-las-vegas/c-281010682?tid=281011650.
196. John Sigety, The Las Vegas Raiders: A Tale of Mark Davis’s Bluff that Could Become a
Reality, SPORTS ESQUIRES (Feb. 4, 2016), http://thesportsesquires.com/the-las-vegas-raiders-a-
tale-of-mark-daviss-bluff-that-could-become-a-reality/.
197. Dustin Gouker, Daily Fantasy Sports Market Size Forecast: Revised Down, with Cloudy
Prospects, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Feb. 22, 2016, 11:49 AM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/
8459/dfs-market-size-forecast/ (citing Adam Krejcik & Chris Grove, Daily Fantasy Sports Indus-
try Update – 2016, EILERS & KREJCIK GAMING (Feb. 22, 2016), https://goo.gl/oDqyxm).
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has been largely ineffective.  Despite its prohibitions, Americans con-
tinue to illegally wager billions on sports.
Moreover, the world has changed significantly since PASPA’s pas-
sage.  Regulatory technology has rapidly evolved.  Concerns over pro-
tecting the “integrity of the game” may now best be addressed
through transparent regulation, not prohibition. Gambling has also
increasingly become a popular and accepted form of entertainment in
the United States, and some of the nation’s professional sports
leagues, such as the NBA, have recently softened their stance regard-
ing PASPA’s prohibitions.  The recent federal court decisions in Chris-
tie I and Christie II have likely pushed back the timeline—barring the
U.S. Supreme Court unexpectedly granting certiorari in the latter
case—but with numerous avenues towards legalization available, a
broad expansion of legal sports gambling in America remains
inevitable.
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